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Abstract
In this work we address the practical challenges of training machine learning mod-
els on privacy-sensitive datasets by introducing a modular approach that mini-
mizes changes to training algorithms, provides a variety of configuration strate-
gies for the privacy mechanism, and then isolates and simplifies the critical logic
that computes the final privacy guarantees. A key challenge is that training algo-
rithms often require estimating many different quantities (vectors) from the same
set of examples — for example, gradients of different layers in a deep learning
architecture, as well as metrics and batch normalization parameters. Each of these
may have different properties like dimensionality, magnitude, and tolerance to
noise. By extending previous work on the Moments Accountant for the subsam-
pled Gaussian mechanism, we can provide privacy for such heterogeneous sets
of vectors, while also structuring the approach to minimize software engineering
challenges.
1 Introduction
There has been much work recently on integrating differential privacy (DP) techniques into itera-
tive training procedures like stochastic gradient descent [Chaudhuri et al., 2011, Bassily et al., 2014,
Abadi et al., 2016, Wu et al., 2017, Papernot et al., 2017]; for completeness we provide a formal def-
inition of DP in Appendix A. Although these works differ in the granularity of privacy guarantees
offered and the method of privacy accounting, most proposed approaches share the general idea of
iteratively computing a model update from training data and then applying the Gaussian mechanism
for differential privacy to the update before incorporating it into the model. Our goal in this work
is to decouple, to the extent possible, three aspects of integrating a privacy mechanism with the
training procedure:
a) the specification of the training procedure itself (e.g., stochastic gradient descent with batch
normalization and simultaneous collection of accuracy metrics and training data statistics),
b) the selection and configuration of the privacymechanisms to apply to each of the aggregates
collected (model gradients, batch normalization weight updates, and metrics), and
c) the accounting procedure used to compute a final (ε, δ)-DP guarantee.
Initial version presented at the NeurIPS ’18 workshop on Privacy Preserving Machine Learning (PPML), De-
cember 2018, Montréal, Canada.
Per-example SGD Microbatch SGD Federated learning
(user-level DP)
record gradient on one example average gradient on one
microbatch (~10 examples)
model update from one
user
sample minibatch (~100 exam-
ples)
minibatch (~10 micro-
batches for a total of 100
examples)
set of participating user
devices for the round
Table 1: Defining record and sample in different training contexts.
This separation is critical: the person implementing a) is likely not a DP expert, and this code
typically already exists; there are many configuration options for b), which will likely require ex-
perimentation, and this configuration logic may become complex; thus isolating the key privacy
calculations in c) and keeping them as simple (and well tested) as possible prevents bugs in a) or b)
from introducing errors in the calculation of the actual privacy achieved.
While model training is our primary motivation, the approach is applicable to any iterative procedure
that fits the following template. We have a database with n records. A record might correspond to a
single training example, a “microbatch” of examples, or all of the data from a particular user or entity
(e.g., to achieve user-level DP as in McMahan et al. [2018]). On each round, a random subset of
records (a sample) is selected and the training procedure consumes the results of a number of vector
queries over that sample; see Table 1. Such vector queries may include the average gradient for each
layer, updates to batch-normalization parameters, or the average value for different training accuracy
metrics. We describe a general approach to allocating a privacy budget across each of these queries
and analyzing the privacy cost of the complete mechanism, all respecting the decoupling of concerns
described earlier. Our analysis builds on the Moments Accountant approach of Abadi et al. [2016],
which applies to a single vector query per round, and generalizes the extension of McMahan et al.
[2018] to multi-vector queries.
We focus on the following basic building block for a single vector. Suppose we have a database
X with n records consisting of vectors xi ∈ RD and we are interested in estimating the average1
1
n
∑
i x
i. Given a selection probability q, clipping threshold S, and noise multiplier z, the procedure
is:
1. Select a subset of the recordsR ⊆ [1, . . . , n] by choosing each record with probability q.
2. Clip each xi for i ∈ R to have maximum L2 norm S using πS(x) = x ·min (1, S/‖x‖2).
3. Output xˆ = 1qn
(∑
i∈R πS
(
xi
)
+N (0;σ2I)) where σ = zS.
The quantity
∑
i∈R πS
(
xi
)
+ N (0;σ2I) is the output of the Gaussian mechanism for sums. As
E[|R|] = qn, scaling it by 1/qn produces an unbiased estimate of the average. The noise multiplier
z ≡ σ/S (the ratio of the noise to the L2-sensitivity of the query) acts as a knob to trade off privacy
vs. utility. If we choose z = 1ε
√
2 ln 1.25/δ, the mechanism is (qε, qδ)-differentially private with
respect to the full database [Beimel et al., 2014, Dwork and Roth, 2014]. Importantly, the privacy
cost of this mechanism is fully specified by q together with the privacy tuple (S, σ), where S is an
upper bound on the L2 norm of the vectors being summed, and σ is the standard deviation of the
noise added to the sum.
We generalize the above procedure to the case where each record corresponds to a collection of
vectors. We still do the sampling step (1) only once, but we estimate the average of each of the
vectors separately, potentially with different clipping thresholds and noise multipliers. Let v =
(v1, . . . , vm) be the total set of vectors for which averages are to be estimated privately. (Note,
we will include the superscript i on the ith record vi only when necessary in equations that sum
over records.) In general, we may partition this set of m vectors into multiple groups, e.g., fully
connected layers vs. convolutional layers vs. metrics. We assume the user (that is, the person using
the privacy tools defined here) has identified the relevant set of groups whose averages are needed
1For simplicity, we focus on unweighted average queries, for example to compute average gradient on a
batch of examples; the generalization to weighted average and vector sum queries is straightforward. We also
restrict attention to the fixed expected denominator ff of McMahan et al. [2018]; extension to other estimators
for averages like their fc is straightforward.
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in the training procedure. For each of these, they need to specify a privacy mechanism together with
some hyperparameters. We first describe the privacy mechanisms that can be applied to individual
vectors or groups of vectors, then show how the privacy cost of the full collection of mechanisms
can be calculated, and finally propose strategies for choosing the parameters to achieve the desired
privacy versus utility tradeoff.
Implementations of techniques in this paper may be found in the open-source TensorFlow Privacy
framework [Google et al., 2018] for TensorFlow [Abadi et al., 2015], as described in Section 7.
2 Privacy mechanisms for a group of vectors
In this section, we describe two strategies that can be applied to a single group of vectors, WLOG
the first k, (v1, . . . , vk), for k ≤ m; when k = 1, the two mechanisms described are identical.
Both mechanisms allow individual noise standard deviation parameters to be used for the separate
groups. While this might at first seem to preclude the use of the Moments Accountant, which
requires spherical noise, we will show how to resolve this issue in the next section.2
Separate clipping and noise parameters. This strategy essentially treats the whole group as a
single concatenated vector v = (v1, . . . , vk). The user provides Sg , a clipping parameter, and σg ,
a noise parameter. For now, assume both of these parameters are simply chosen so as to provide
reasonable utility for the resulting average; we will discuss strategies for choosing these parameters
in detail in Section 4. The output of the mechanism is
vˆj =
1
qn
∑
i∈R
πSg
(
vi
)
j
+N (0;σ2gI) =
1
qn
(∑
i∈R
πSg
(
vi
)
+N (0; σ˜2gI)
)
j
,
where σ˜g = qnσg and j ∈ [k]. The final expression shows that the mechanism is equivalent
to the Gaussian mechanism for sums with privacy tuple (Sg, σ˜g). Applying this mechanism with
Sg = S
∗ to all m vectors recovers the “flat clipping” approach of McMahan et al. [2018], and
applying this mechanism separately to each of the vectors with Sg = S∗/
√
m recovers their “per-
layer clipping” approach (where S∗ is the total L2 bound). Another reasonable strategy that takes
into account dimensionality is to apply the mechanism separately with Sg = S∗/
√
dg/D where dg
is the dimensionality of vg.
Joint clipping. Here we introduce a new mechanism that allows us to clip less aggressively than
applying the previous strategy to each vector individually, while still letting different vectors live
on different multiplicative scales. The user supplies as input scale parameters α1, . . . , αk, which
may be thought of as bounds or reasonable L2 norm clip parameters on the individual vi, were
they to be clipped individually. The strategy first does a pre-processing step via the scaling op-
erator s(v;α1:k) = (v1/α1, . . . , vk/αk). If ‖vj‖2 ≤ αj for all j ∈ [k], then the joint norm
‖s(v;α1:k)‖2 ≤
√
k, however it may typically be much less. Then joint clipping and noising is
performed using a total clipping parameter Sg ∈
[
0,
√
k
]
and noise with the standard deviation
of αjσg . The mechanism’s output then scales the vectors back by the αj factor in post-processing:
vˆj =
1
qn
∑
i∈R
αjπSg
(
s(vi;α1:k)
)
j
+N (0; (αjσg)2I)
=
αj
qn
(∑
i∈R
πSg
(
s(vi;α1:k)
)
+N (0; σ˜2gI)
)
j
,
where again σ˜g = qnσg. The final expression shows the output can be written as a post-processing of
the subsampled Gaussian mechanism for sums with privacy tuple (Sg, σ˜g). Note that if no clipping
happens then αjπSg(s(v;α1:k))j = vj for all j.
To see where this mechanism might be superior to the first, suppose v1 and v2 have ‖v1‖2 ≤ 1 and
‖v2‖2 ≤ 100, and suppose they can tolerate noise standard deviations of 0.01 and 1 respectively.
2Privacy mechanisms for groups can be used within TensorFlow Privacy [Google et al., 2018] by employing
the NestedQuery class, which evaluates an arbitrary nested structure of queries where each leaf query would
be a GaussianAverageQuery corresponding to one group of vectors.
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Additionally, assume it is known that either vi
1
or vi
2
will be zero for any record i. We could clip
these separately, but this ignores the (useful) side information that one of the vectors is always zero.
On the other hand, if we treat them as a single group, we cannot take into the account the fact they
are on very different scales; in particular, we must pick a single noise value which will either be
insufficient to add privacy for v2, or will completely obscure the signal in v1. The joint mechanism
proposed here lets us directly handle this situation using α1 = 1, α2 = 100, σg = 0.01, and Sg = 1.
3 Composing privacy guarantees for multiple vector groups
Now, suppose we have partitioned the m vectors into G groups, and selected a privacy mechanism
for each one, producing privacy tuples (Sg, σ˜g) for g ∈ {1, . . . , G}. From a privacy accounting point
of view, each of these mechanisms is equivalent to running a Gaussian sum query on vectorswg with
‖wg‖ ≤ Sg and then adding noise σ˜g to the final sum. We now demonstrate a transformation that
lets us analyze this composite mechanism as a single Gaussian sum query on the sample for use with
the privacy accountant.
First, we scale each vector s(w; σ˜1:G) = (
w1
σ˜1
, . . . , wGσ˜G ), so ‖s(w; σ˜1:G)‖ ≤ S∗ ≡
√∑
g (Sg/σ˜g)
2
.
Now, we imagine a single Gaussian sum query with noise standard deviation σ = 1, and output the
estimate after rescaling by the σ˜g factors. This is equivalent since
wˆg =
1
qn
(∑
i∈R
wig +N (0; σ˜2gI)
)
=
σ˜g
qn
(∑
i∈R
s(wi; σ˜1:G) +N (0; I)
)
g
. (1)
The final expression is a simple post-processing on the output of a single Gaussian sum query with
parameters (S∗, σ = 1). Thus, we can apply the privacy accountant to bound the privacy loss of
iterative applications of this mechanism.
4 Hyperparameter selection strategies
Here we consider selecting hyperparameters q, Sg , and σg to achieve a particular privacy vs. utility
tradeoff. Recall for both mechanisms, σ˜g = qnσg , so the key quantity is
z =
1
S∗
=
(∑
g
(Sg/σ˜g)
2
)−1/2
= qn
(∑
g
(Sg/σg)
2
)−1/2
.
Typically, a value of z ≈ 1 will provide a reasonable privacy guarantee. If z is too small for the de-
sired level of privacy, the user has several knobs available: clip more aggressively by decreasing the
Sg’s; noise more aggressively by scaling up the σg’s; or increasing q. When datasets are large and
the additional computational cost of processing larger samples R is affordable, this last approach
is generally preferable, as observed by McMahan et al. [2018]. If additionally the total number of
iterations T is known, then since the privacy cost scales monotonically with any of these adjust-
ments to z, a binary search can be performed using the privacy accountant repeatedly with different
parameters to find e.g. the precise value of q needed to achieve a particular (ε, δ)-DP guarantee.
Choosing σg and Sg . Typical approaches to setting Sg include: 1) using an a priori upper bound
on the L2 norm; 2) choosing Sg so that “few” vectors are clipped; or 3) running parameter tuning
grids to find a value of Sg that does not reduce utility (e.g., the accuracy of the model) by too much.
If private data is used in 2) or 3), the privacy cost of this should be accounted for. Similar strategies
can be used to choose σg , e.g., selecting a value that will introduce an a priori acceptable amount of
error, or more likely for model training, running experiments to find the largest amount of noise that
does not slow the training procedure.
In some cases one may have bounds Sg on the norms of G groups plus an overall target value of z,
which needs to be distributed across multiple groups. To achieve proportional noise, where σ˜g ∝ Sg
for all g, we can use σ˜g = z
√
GSg . Another reasonable alternative, dimensionality adjusted noise
assigns noise proportional to the maximum root mean squared value of the components of wg given
its bound and its dimensionality: σ˜g = z
√
D/dgSg, where dg is the dimensionality of group g and
D ≡∑g dg .
4
5 Sampling policies
The basic update step of the SGD algorithm operates on a small subset of records (the mini-
batch). Convergence guarantees of the standard optimization theory hold under the assumption
that each minibatch is an i.i.d. sample of the training dataset, and the original Moments Accountant
by Abadi et al. [2016] supported privacy analysis in this regime.
In practice, there are valid reasons for using alternative policies for sampling minibatches, with
implications for privacy analysis. We list three of the most common sampling policies below.
Minibatches are i.i.d. samples. Privacy of this sampling procedure is analyzed by Abadi et al.
[2016] and it is used by the federated learning framework where decisions of whether to participate
in a particular update step are made locally [McMahan et al., 2018]. If the privacy accountant is
dependent on the secrecy of the sample (as in the case of the Moments Accountant), then the size
of the sample cannot be released without applying a privacy-preserving mechanism, which can be
as simple as additive noise. The variability of the sample’s size makes this sampling policy a poor
fit for hardware accelerators. It can be repaired by sampling subsets of a fixed size from the training
set without replacement, which leads us to the next policy.
Minibatches are equally sized and independent. The basic SGD corresponds to this sampling
policy and minibatches of cardinality 1. Recent works analyze composition of this sampling policy
with a mechanism satisfying RDP [Wang et al., 2018] or tCDP [Bun et al., 2018]. Independence of
minibatches makes analysis of multiple iterations of SGD straightforward via application of compo-
sition rules for differential privacy.
Minibatches are equally sized and disjoint. In practice, the most common manner of forming
minibatches is permuting the training dataset and partitioning it into disjoint subsets of a fixed size.
After a single pass (an epoch) the process is repeated. This sampling policy can be efficiently im-
plemented, and has intuitive semantics: an epoch corresponds to a training cycle when all examples
were visited exactly once. Quantitatively tight analysis of DP-SGD in this model is not known. (A
related problem of analyzing randomized response followed by a random permutation is addressed
by Erlingsson et al. [2019].)
6 Privacy ledger
In principle, privacy accounting (via, e.g. the moments accountant) could be done in tandem with
calls to the mechanism to keep an online estimate of the (ǫ, δ) privacy guarantee. However we
advocate a different approach which cleanly separates concerns b) and c) from the introduction. We
maintain a privacy ledger and record two types of events: sampling events, which record that a set
R of records has been drawn using parameters q and n, and sum query events, which record that
a Gaussian sum query has been performed over some group of vectors with privacy tuple (Sg, σ˜g).
Then the privacy accountant can process the ledger post hoc to produce a privacy guarantee, first
converting each group of one sampling event plus some sum query events to an equivalent single
sum query event with parameters (S∗, σ = 1) using Equation (1).
There are two main advantages of this approach. First, bugs in the hyperparameter selection strategy
code cannot affect the privacy estimate. Second, it allows the privacy accounting mechanism to be
changed and the ledger reprocessed if, for example, a tighter bound on the privacy loss is discovered
after the data has been processed.
7 TensorFlow Privacy
TensorFlow Privacy [Google et al., 2018]3 is a Python library that implements TensorFlow optimiz-
ers for training machine learning models with differential privacy. The library comes with tutorials
and analysis tools for computing the privacy guarantees provided. From an engineering perspective,
the implementation of differentially private optimizers found in the library leverages the decoupled
structure outlined above to make it easier for developers to both (a) wrap most optimizers into their
3Available from https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy under Apache 2.0 license.
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differentially private counterpart and (b) compare different privacy mechanisms and accounting pro-
cedures.
Perhaps the library is best illustrated by one of its main use cases: training a neural network with
differentially-private stochastic gradient descent [Abadi et al., 2016]. Given the stochastic gradient
descent optimizer class, tf.train.GradientDescentOptimizer, implemented in the main Ten-
sorFlow library, one first wraps it into a new optimizer that implements logic for both the clipping
and noising of gradients needed to obtain privacy. This is done by having the optimizer estimate the
gradients via an instance of a class implementing the DPQuery interface. A DPQuery is responsi-
ble for clipping gradients computed by the optimizer, accumulating them, and returning their noisy
average to the optimizer. This introduces two additional hyperparameters to the optimizer: the clip-
ping norm and the noise multiplier. The PrivacyLedger class maintains a record of the sum query
events for each sampling event which can then be processed by the RDP accountant.
In addition, our implementation leverages microbatches, as defined in Table 1. This implies that
gradients are computed over several examples before they are clipped, and once all microbatches in
a minibatch have been processed, they are averaged and noised. This introduces a third additional
hyperparameter to the optimizer: the number of microbatches. Increasing it often improves utility
but typically slows down training.
TensorFlow Privacy is also designed to work with training in a federated context in the vein
of McMahan et al. [2018]. In that case the “gradients” supplied to the DPQuery would in fact be
the model updates supplied by the users in a given round.
Finally, to compute the (ε, δ) differential privacy guarantee for the model, an implementation of the
RDP accountant is provided. Given the sampling fraction q and the noise multiplier z, the RDP is
computed for a step. Summing the RDP over the steps, it can then estimate ε for a fixed δ.
8 Floating-point arithmetic and randomness source
The hallmark feature of the definition of differential privacy is that it is uncoditional, in other words,
it makes no assumptions about the adversarial knowledge or capabilities. It also puts a high bur-
den on a differentially private implementation: its output distribution must have effectively infi-
nite entropy. In practice, the distribution is defined over only a finite domain (such as a vector of
single-precision floating-point numbers) and the source of randomness is guaranteed (at best) to be
computationally secure. We consider these issues in turn.
Floating-point arithmetic. The problem of achieving differential privacy by means of standard
floating-point arithmetic has been addressed for the additive Laplace mechanism byMironov [2012].
We leave open the task of developing a provable floating-point implementation of DP-SGD and
integrating it into an ML library.
Sources of randomness. Most computational devices have access only to few sources of entropy
and they tend to be very low rate (hardware interrupts, on-board sensors). It is standard—and theoret-
ically well justified—to use the entropy to seed a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG) and use the PRNG’s output as needed. Robust and efficient PRNGs based on
standard cryptographic primitives exist that have output rate of gigabytes per second on modern
CPUs and require a seed as short as 128 bits [Salmon et al., 2011].
The output distribution of a randomized algorithm A with access to a PRNG is indistinguishable
from the output distribution of A with access to a true source of entropy as long as the distinguisher
is computationally bounded. Compare it with the guarantee of differential privacy which holds
against any adversary, no matter how powerful. As such, virtually all implementations of differential
privacy satisfy only (variants of) Computational Differential Privacy introduced by [Mironov et al.,
2009]. On the positive side, a computationally-bounded adversary cannot tell the difference, which
allows us to avoid being overly pedantic about this point.
A training procedure may have multiple sources of non-determinism (e.g., dropout layers or an in-
put of a generative model) but only those that are reflected in the privacy ledger must come from
a cryptographically secure PRNG. In particular, the minibatch sampling procedure and the additive
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Gaussian noise must be drawn from a PRNG for the trained model to satisfy computational differen-
tial privacy. In contrast, microbatches need not be chosen using a randomized process.
9 Conclusion
We have shown how the Gaussian mechanism can be applied to vectors of different types with dif-
ferent norm bounds and noise standard deviations, enabling training over heterogeneous parameter
vectors, as well as simultaneous privacy-preserving estimation of other statistics such as classifier
accuracy, or the number of instances in each class. By implementing iterative training algorithms
in terms of a series of Gaussian sum queries and then recording for each query privacy events to a
ledger to be processed by a privacy accountant, we separate the three major concerns of implement-
ing privacy-preserving iterative training procedures while allowing flexibility in the specification of
clipping strategy and noise allocation. The techniques described in the paper can be easily imple-
mented using the Tensorflow Privacy library.
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A Differential Privacy
The formal definition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy is provided here for reference:
Definition 1. A randomized mechanismM : D 7→ R satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any
two adjacent datasets X,X ′ ∈ D and for any measurable subset of outputs Y ⊆ R it holds that
Pr [M(X) ∈ Y] ≤ eε Pr [M(X ′) ∈ Y] + δ.
The interpretation of adjacent datasets above determines the unit of information that is protected
by the algorithm: a differentially private mechanism guarantees that two datasets differing only by
addition or removal of a single unit produce outputs that are nearly indistinguishable. For machine
learning applications the two most common cases are example-level privacy (e.g., Chaudhuri et al.
[2011], Bassily et al. [2014], Abadi et al. [2016], Wu et al. [2017], Papernot et al. [2017]), in which
an adversary cannot tell with high confidence from the learned model parameters whether a given
example was present in the training set, or user-level privacy (e.g., McMahan et al. [2018]) in which
adding or removing an entire user’s data from the training set should not substantially impact the
learned model. It is also possible to consider X and X ′ to be adjacent if they differ by replacing a
training example (or an entire user’s data) with another, which would increase the ε by a factor of
two.
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